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TanzaniaEvolutionary and economicmodels of the demographic transition argue that economic development incentivizes
low-fertility, high-investment parental strategies, and that such strategies emergeﬁrst in relativelywealthy fam-
ilies within populations undergoing ‘modernization’. However, most research focuses on fertility reduction rath-
er than shifting parental investment, and few studies consider how parental decisions regarding educational
investment vary in relation to alternative rural livelihoods. Using data from 19 villages and 1,719 children
(7–19 years), we investigate the effects of diversifying livelihoods, wealth and child characteristics on multiple
measures of educational investment in rural Tanzania. Children in (predominantly Maasai) pastoralist house-
holdswere the least likely to attend school, while neighboring farmers and business owners investedmore in ed-
ucation. Household wealth, as measured by asset ownership, was also independently positively associated with
educational investment for all livelihood types. These results are consistent with lower opportunity costs and
greater perceived economic pay-offs to education for relatively labormarket-integrated andwealthy households.
However, among pastoralists wealth held in livestock was not associated with educational investment. This re-
sult may reﬂect elevated opportunity costs related to the child labor demands of livestock herding. We ﬁnd a
marginal female advantage in education, which is surprising because qualitative research and numerous devel-
opment projects in the region emphasize the disadvantages facing girls. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence of a
later-born disadvantage (i.e. borderline statistically signiﬁcant) consistent with the predicted consequences of
sequential household resource dilution. Female advantage and later-born disadvantagewere particularly evident
in the wealthiest households. Greater reliability in the returns to education for wealthy households may favor
preferential treatment of children with higher perceived long-term payoffs, while equal but lower-level invest-
ment in all children in relatively poor families may reﬂect a bet-hedging strategy. We discuss our results in
light of parental investment theory and the wider literature on the demographic transition.Agency for Inte
Minnesota, and
K Medical Resea
mber: MR/K021
lth, London Scho
).
. This is an open©2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Parental investment in schooling, rural livelihoods andeconomic development
Human life history is characterized by high levels of parental invest-
ment, an extended period of juvenile dependency, and a reliance on
complex skills acquired through social learning (Hill & Kaplan, 1999;
Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, & Hurtado, 2000;Mace, 2000). Inmany societies,rnational Devel-
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access article underthe demands of costly parental investment are to some extent offset by
the labor contributions of children, which subsidize their parents’ con-
tinued reproduction (Kramer, 2011; Lee & Kramer, 2002; Turke,
1988). Optimal levels of fertility, parental investment and offspring
time allocation are thus predicted to vary by socioecological factors, in-
cluding the opportunities for both child and adult labor dictated by local
livelihoods. Evolutionary and economic models of the demographic
transition argue that shifts from subsistence to market economies in-
crease dependency on skills acquired through formal education, deval-
ue child labor, and strengthen the link between parental investment
and offspring outcomes, incentivizing both fertility limitation and the
further extension of juvenile dependency (Kaplan, 1996). Many re-
searchers have suggested that such shifts may be adaptive in terms of
long-term genetic ﬁtness, provided substantial economic rewards are
bestowed on descendants (e.g. Boone & Kessler, 1999; Mace, 1998).
However, multigenerational studies suggest that modern below-the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Goodman, Koupil, and Lawson (2012), for example, demonstrate that
across four generations of Swedish families, low fertility was associated
with improved school results, higher levels of educational attainment
and increased household incomes for descendants, but did not improve
long-term descendant survival, marital or reproductive success (see
also Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998a; Kaplan, Lancaster, Johnson, & Bock,
1995). Consequently, transitions tomodern low fertility appear best un-
derstood as parental decisions to enhance self and offspring embodied
capital in order to enhance economic and social success. However, in
contexts where opportunities for skill and resource acquisition conﬂict
with childbearing, and where the likelihood of offspring survival and re-
production is only weakly contingent on accumulated wealth, parental
investment is decoupled from offspring reproductive success and deci-
sions to invest in embodied capital appear not to maximize ﬁtness
(Goodman et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 1995).While high investment in ed-
ucation and economic successmay not be adaptive in post-transition en-
vironments, changes in parental investment decisions are undoubtedly
central to our understanding of the demographic transition.
This viewpoint draws our attention directly to education, a funda-
mental component of parental investment that is believed to enhance
a child’s wellbeing and success worldwide. Trivers (1972: 139) deﬁned
parental investment as “any investment by the parent in the offspring that
increases the offspring’s chance of survival (and hence reproductive suc-
cess) at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other offspring”. Parental
investment can also enhance offspring reproductive success by improv-
ing close proxies such as economic success and social status. As commu-
nities undergo demographic and subsistence transitions, formal
schooling replaces more traditional forms of learning as an important
aspect of embodied capital acquisition. Schooling is costly to parents,
both directly, through expenditure on school fees and supplies, and in-
directly, because it reduces children’s ability to offset their costs through
economic contributions to their household. Here, we propose to shift
evolutionary analyses of demographic transition from their traditional
focus on fertility reduction to the variability in parental investment in
education (see also Gibson & Lawson, 2011; Gibson & Sear, 2010).
In addition we address a broader need for studies of educational in-
vestment from speciﬁc rural communities undergoing economic change.
As indicated by the inclusion of universal, equitable education in both
theMillenniumDevelopment Goals (United Nations, 2015a) and their re-
placements the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015b),
investment in education is a key focus of development initiatives, yet
much of what we know about investment in child health and education
in the developing world comes from large-scale, highly aggregated na-
tional surveys, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (e.g.
Eloundou-Enyegue & Williams, 2006). While valuable in identifying
broad trends, such surveys are inadequate for exploring patterns within
communities, and typically lack appropriate data to consider the role of al-
ternative rural livelihoods, such as differences between pastoralists and
agriculturalists (Lawson & Uggla, 2014; Lawson et al., 2015). Livelihood
variation is likely to be an important determinant of parental investment
patterns, because reliance on child labor alters the opportunity costs of
school attendance, and because the value of formal education in confer-
ring skills relevant to the realities of adult livelihoods may differ.
In this paper, we explore patterns of child education in a region of
northern Tanzania that has undergone rapid and recent uptake of edu-
cation, but remains predominantly characterized by different degrees of
reliance on subsistence-level farming and pastoralism and different ac-
cess to education. Our data come from 19 villages sampled from one re-
gion as part of the Whole Village Project (Borgerhoff Mulder et al.,
2010), selected in order to provide a snap-shot of recently diversiﬁed
livelihoods. Threemain ethnic groups occupy these villages: theMaasai,
the Arusha and the Meru.While primarily pastoralist, in recent decades
Maasai livelihoods have diversiﬁed, with increased levels of settlement
and cultivation (Coast, 2002; Spear & Waller, 1993). The Arusha were
originally Maasai pastoralists, who settled and became farmers twocenturies ago, though cattle remain a key aspect of their livelihood strat-
egy and they retain cultural similarities to theMaasai (Spear, 1997: 35).
Finally, the Meru have traditionally been farmers, and were early
adopters of cash crops such as coffee (Spear, 1997: 154). Compared to
other ethnic groups in the region the Meru are relatively wealthy
(Lawson et al., 2014). This sample thus encapsulates a broad range of
livelihood strategies, from predominant reliance on pastoralism,
through increasing degrees of subsistence agropastoralism, to commer-
cial agriculture and business ownership, reﬂecting thedevelopment and
accompanying subsistence transitions that have occurred in this area
over the past century.
1.2. Predictions and prior literature
Wederive a number of predictions regarding parental investment in
child education in this setting concerning both parental and child char-
acteristics. First, we consider variation in child education by livelihood
type. There are a number of reasons to suspect that pastoralists general-
ly face greater direct and indirect costs, and lower returns to children’s
education, compared to other livelihood groups. East African pastoral-
ism is labor-intensive, requiring many workers to allow for ﬂexible
and specialized labor allocation, with households traditionally
recruiting children from the ages of 6 or 7 (Sperling & Galaty, 1990).
Herding also requires an all-day commitment, especially when grazing
or water is far from households (Coppolillo, 2001), making herding
largely incompatible with school attendance, in contrast to farm work,
which can be done before or after school hours. This dependence on
child labor, as well as long journeys to school, increases the opportunity
costs of attending school for pastoralists compared to households rely-
ing on cultivation (Bishop, 2007; Heffernan, Misturelli, & Nielsen,
2001; Holland, 1996). Maasai pastoralists tend to be poorer than neigh-
boring farming populations, at least whenwealth is assessed in terms of
material assets (e.g. Lawson et al., 2014), suggesting that pastoralists are
also less able tomeet the direct costs of schooling. Poor child health, and
so presumably higher child mortality rates, associated with poverty
among pastoralist populations may also reduce the certainty of the
long-term returns on investment in education (Lawson et al., 2014).
These higher costs and lower returns to education are evidenced by
the perception of formal education as ‘practically irrelevant’ to a pasto-
ralist way of life (Bishop, 2007). These perceptions are compounded by
the difﬁculties faced by pastoralist children in accessing education, in-
cluding stigmatization by teachers and peers, language barriers, and
the lack of viable employment alternatives in rural areas (Bishop,
2007; Dyer, 2010). By contrast, parents with salaried jobs or small busi-
nessesmay perceive skills taught in school to bemore relevant and use-
ful for their children’s futures, andmay be more likely, or better able, to
take advantage of the job opportunities made available by formal edu-
cation. This leads to the prediction that (1) educational investment will
be lower for children in pastoralist households, intermediate for those in
farming households, and highest for those in business-owning households.
Taking advantage of within-village variation in livelihoods, we use a
multilevel framework to test this prediction, effectively contrasting
households by occupation within the same local socioecological con-
text, using random effects for village. While it is recognized that pasto-
ralists are often disadvantaged in access to education, the extent to
which this is attributable to their livelihood strategy independently of
their relative poverty is unclear. By adjusting for household wealth,
we aim to determine the extent to which livelihood strategy, insofar
as it shifts the costs and possibly the beneﬁts of education, inﬂuences
educational investment over and above household economic status.
Second, we consider how variation in household wealth inﬂuences
school enrolmentwithin communities.Wealthier households are better
able tomeet the direct costs of schooling, and aremore certain of invest-
ment returns due to lower mortality rates (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan,
Lancaster, Tucker, & Anderson, 2002). Additionally they have lower op-
portunity costs through being less reliant on child labor, as they are able
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(Borgerhoff Mulder & Sellen, 1994). In historic European demographic
transitions, there is evidence that the wealthiest were the ﬁrst to
adopt fertility limitation (Clark & Cummins, 2009; Coale & Treadway,
1986), and the ﬁrst to invest in education for their children
(Lesthaeghe & Wilson, 1986). We explore the evidence for this pattern
in our sample, but also consider whether or not household wealth has
the same consequences for education outcomes among both farmers
and pastoralists. Studies of pastoralist groups have documented large
differences in household wealth, but little effect of wealth on child
growth and nutrition (Grandin, 1988; Sellen, 2003). It has been sug-
gested that this may be due to wealth, food and labor transfers between
households leveling inter-household differences, or different priorities
within households leading to excess wealth being invested into extra
cattle or wives for men, rather than extra investment in existing chil-
dren (Sellen, 2003; Sieff, 1997). While decisions about educational in-
vestment are likely to involve different considerations, Bishop (2007)
did observe that the proportion of children enrolled in school did not
differ signiﬁcantly according to wealth in a small-scale study of
Tanzanian Maasai pastoralists. Wealthier pastoralist households typi-
cally have larger herds and therefore greater labor requirements than
poorer households, so despite being better able to meet the direct
costs of schooling, they may face greater opportunity costs due to
their greater need for child herding labor (Bishop, 2007; Sellen, 2003).
It is therefore predicted that (2) educational investment will increase
with household wealth but to a lesser extent among pastoralists than
among farmers or business-owners.
Third, we examine evidence for biased parental investment in terms
of child sex and birth order. Evolutionary and economicmodels lead to a
general prediction that parents will strategically focus investment into
children with the greatest (perceived) returns in the long-term. In evo-
lutionary models payoffs are ultimately measured as reproductive suc-
cess, but outcomes such as mating or economic competition may serve
as more salient proxies guiding behavior. Many factors may inﬂuence
the pay-offs to investing preferentially in sons or daughters
(Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; Sear, 2011), and evolutionary anthropolo-
gists have been instrumental in documenting cases of both son and
daughter-bias in parental investment in rural East African populations
(Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; Cronk, 1989; Gibson & Lawson, 2011;
Gibson & Sear, 2010; Mace & Sear, 1997). Recently the Trivers and
Willard (1973) hypothesis has been applied to educational investment
in western populations (Hopcroft & Martin, 2014). The Trivers–Willard
hypothesis stipulates that investment will be biased towards the sex
with the greater variance in reproductive success, so long as reproduc-
tive success is inﬂuenced by parental investment. Under such condi-
tions, which may occur for example in polygynous contexts where
men can accumulate multiple wives, the ﬁtness returns to producing a
daughter will be higher for relatively poor parents while the returns to
producing a son will be higher for relatively rich parents. There is
some support for Trivers–Willard effects on sex-ratio biasing at birth
in humans (e.g. Gibson & Mace, 2003). However, whether or not post-
natal investment is predicted to follow a Trivers–Willard pattern is a
point of some confusion in the literature (Hartung, 1997; Keller, Nesse,
& Hofferth, 2001). This is because the comparative ﬁtness value of pro-
ducing a son versus a daughter can vary independently of the marginal
ﬁtness returns of investing in current offspring of either sex. Indeed if
male reproductive (and economic) success is more closely predicted by
parental investment, then post-natal investment, at least when not closely
linked to survival, is predicted to favor males across the population inde-
pendent of parental wealth (Keller et al., 2001). Furthermore, in patrilocal
societies not just offspring, but also parents aremore likely to beneﬁt from
investing in sons’over daughters economic success, because thebeneﬁts of
daughters’ education are perceived to accrue to her husband’s family
(Grogan, 2007). In sub-Saharan Africa as awhole, gender bias in education
is evident, with girls being less likely to be enrolled in school than boys,
particularly for secondary education (United Nations, 2013).Where birth order has been shown tomatter, later-born children are
most often disadvantaged, with numerous studies reporting detrimen-
tal effects of older siblings on indicators of both reproductive and eco-
nomic success (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; Gibson & Lawson,
2011; Gibson& Sear, 2010;Mace, 1996).With regard to parental invest-
ments during childhood, such bias may simply reﬂect household re-
source dilution; ﬁnite resources must be shared between all living
children, and early-born children experience more time in a household
with fewer competitors, prior to the birth of subsequent siblings
(Hertwig, Davis, & Sulloway, 2002). On the other hand, older siblings
may also work to provide assistance towards the education of younger
children, and diminishing returns to additional labor may decrease the
opportunity costs of younger children’s schooling (Borgerhoff Mulder,
1998b; see Chernichovsky, 1985 for evidence from Botswana; Gomes,
1984 for Kenya). Bias towards early-born offspring is also predicted by
some theoretical models because ﬁrst-borns are typically of higher re-
productive value than later borns at anyonepoint in timewhenparental
investment decisions are beingmade. This is both because older children
are closer to beginning their own reproduction, and because child mor-
tality rates tend to decrease with increasing age (Clutton-Brock, 1991).
In light of these considerations we predict that (3) educational invest-
ment will be lower in daughters and later-born children.
Finally, we consider whether variation in wealth inﬂuences patterns
of gender and birth order-biased parental investment. This research
question is perhaps particularly interesting in the face of contrasting
predictions and seemingly contrary ﬁndings at alternative scales of
analysis in the existing literature. At a national level, economic develop-
ment is generally associated with a closing gender gap in education,
with literature emphasizing changing social norms and a relaxation of
the resource constraints that lead to biased investment (United Nations,
2013). As such wealthier households within communities might be an-
ticipated to abandon strategies of biased parental investment in parallel
with macro-level trends. Yet, recent studies examining parental invest-
ment in education within developing rural communities have reported
that patterns of biased investment are exaggerated in the wealthiest
households. Gibson and Sear (2010) for example found in a study of
rural communities in Ethiopia and Malawi that educational investment
(measured as any education and total years of education respectively)
was higher for early-born sons and daughters respectively, and that
these birth order biases were most pronounced among the wealthiest
households (Gibson & Sear, 2010). In Ethiopia, villages with recently
installed water taps, where child mortality had substantially decreased,
were found to have higher overall levels of school enrolment. However,
villages with taps also showed greater discrimination by birth order,
with later-borns receiving less education than their older siblings
(Gibson& Lawson, 2011). Theseﬁndings have been interpreted as an in-
dication of the emergence of high parental investment strategies in con-
texts of increasing perceived returns to education, but where fertility
remains relatively high and resources too scarce to enable high invest-
ment in all children. In such circumstances, parents may choose to in-
vest preferentially in speciﬁc children rather than spread investments
equally across all children. In contrast relatively poor families face
higher levels of extrinsic risk and uncertainty over the returns to invest-
ment, making it harder for parents to predict which offspring will have
the most favorable prospects, and favoring a ‘bet-hedging’ strategy of
low, but relatively equal investment in all offspring (Liddell, Barrett, &
Henzi, 2003). Here we seek to replicate these ﬁndings predicting
(4) biases in educational investment by gender and birth order will be
more pronounced in wealthier households.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. The Whole Village Project
This study uses data from the Whole Village Project (WVP), a re-
search project conducted by the Tanzanian non-governmental
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with the University of Minnesota and the National Institute of Medical
Research (NIMR). The WVP collects data from 56 villages in Northern
Tanzania, in order to support the evaluation of development projects
in the region, and to provide a source of data about rural Tanzania. Vil-
lageswere sampled partly according to the needs of development agen-
cy partners, but effortsweremade to randomize selection and to ensure
a wide geographic spread of villages. Within villages, 60–75 households
were randomly sampled from a list provided by village administrators.
For a general description of the WVP, see Borgerhoff Mulder et al.
(2010), or the SFTZ website (www.sftz.org). The WVP received ethical
approval from the University of Minnesota (Institutional Review Board
code number: 0905S65241) and from the National Health Research
Ethics Review Committee at NIMR.
The current study utilizes data on 19WVP villages in the Arusha re-
gion, a subsample selected to allow for the comparison of different live-
lihood strategies within the same administrative context and
geographic area, giving a working sample of 1,215 households used in
our analysis (with an additional 74 households excluded due to incom-
plete data on household wealth, livelihood or ethnicity). Table 1
contains information on the demographic and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the households in this sample.2.2. Wealth and livelihood measures
For each household, several wealth and livelihood measures were
recorded, including asset ownership, food insecurity, livestock owner-
ship, and the amount of land cultivated. Livelihood was determined by
the main occupation stated by the household head. Those who stated
‘Other’ activities were included as ‘Farmers’, as the majority reported
cultivating land and had similar patterns of asset ownership. A continu-
ous household wealth index was calculated on the basis of a principal
component analysis (PCA). The PCA was applied to a total of 37 dichot-
omous variables representing ownership of assets and characteristics of
assets at the household level (for more information see the online sup-
plementary material to Lawson et al., 2014). The household wealth
index ranged in value from 0.14 to 17.8 (mean= 3.52, standard devia-
tion (SD) = 2.85). Livestock ownership was not included in the assets
used to create the index, and so this measure should be interpreted as
a ‘non-livestock wealth index’.
Anthropological studies often use livestock ownership as the
most salient indicator of wealth for pastoralist communities, where
ownership of consumer durables may be rare and incompatible with
a nomadic lifestyle (e.g. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998b; Mace, 1996;
Sellen, 2003; Sieff, 1997). In this dataset, ownership of large livestock
(cattle, horses, donkeys and mules) was converted into Tropical
Livestock Units (TLUs) using the conversion factors listed in Jahnke,
Tacher, Keil, and Rojat (1988). As the distribution of TLUs was highly
skewed, with many households having few livestock and a few having
very large herds, a log transformation was used. Food insecurity
was measured using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
(HFIAS), which assesses the extent to which households experienced
problems accessing food during the last 30 days (Coates, Swindale, &
Bilinsky, 2007). Among pastoralists, TLUs are correlated with increased
wealth (r = 0.18, p b 0.001), but there is no correlation between
TLUs and wealth index for farmers or business owners (r = −0.01,
p = 0.797), suggesting that TLUs do not serve as an appropriate indica-
tor of wealth across the whole sample. Bishop (2007) conducted quali-
tative wealth ranking exercises among Maasai men in Arusha,
and found that they did emphasize material assets such as modern
housing, as well as livestock, as an indicator of wealth. The asset-
derived wealth index is therefore used as the principal proxy of eco-
nomic status in this analysis, though models were also run substituting
the log transformation of the TLU variable for the wealth index variable
for pastoralists only.2.3. Measuring ‘educational investment’: enrolment, progression and years
of education
Education in Tanzania is compulsory between the ages of 7 and 14.
The education system includes seven years of primary education (i.e.
the compulsory component), four years of ‘ordinary-level’ secondary
education, and two years of ‘advanced-level’ secondary education. Pri-
mary schools are free (although there are costs like uniform, shoes
andmiscellaneous requests for school funds that can be quite signiﬁcant
for the poorest households), and the language of instruction is in the na-
tional language Swahili. Feesmust be paid for secondary school, and the
language of instruction changes to English, although Swahili may often
be used in practice (UNESCO, 2011). Net primary school enrolment has
increased dramatically, from 49% in 1999 to 83% in 2013, though there
has been a decline from 97% in 2008 (World Bank, 2015). Gender equal-
ity in access to education has improved at primary level, but girls are un-
derrepresented at secondary and higher level (UNESCO, 2011). Less
than 60% of boys and girls progress to secondary school, and there are
concerns over the low quality of schooling available, and the failure to
attract well-qualiﬁed teachers, especially to rural areas (United Nations,
2015c; World Bank, 2015).
We use threemeasures of educational investment for children iden-
tiﬁed as the biological child of the household head (n = 1,803). These
measures were generated from a household survey question asking
“What is the highest level of education reached by this person?”, for
all household members above the age of 5, which provided valid re-
sponses for 1,719 (95.3%) cases. Those with ‘none’ or ‘nursery’ listed
as their highest level of educationwere assumednever to have attended
school. Those answering Form 1 (ﬁrst year of secondary school educa-
tion) or above were assumed to have completed primary education
and progressed to secondary school. Two binary variables were there-
fore generated; (i) Ever educated, indicating whether an individual had
ever attended school, and (ii) Progressed, indicatingwhether an individ-
ual aged 14 or over had progressed to secondary school. A third variable,
Edyears, was generated from the highest level reached as an indicator of
the total years of education, for example an individual who had reached
Standard 1 (ﬁrst year of school) was assumed to have one year
of education.
2.4. Child characteristics
Child age, gender and a proxy for birth order were included in our
analysis. The birth order proxy was generated by ordering biological
children within the same household by age and assigning them a rank,
with the oldest child being ﬁrst. This measure is thus a reﬂection of ‘so-
cial birth order’, rather than biological birth order, indicating an individ-
ual’s age rank relative to other school-aged children within the same
household. This proxy is used because data were only collected for indi-
viduals residentwithin the household, rather than complete birth histo-
ries. This means that children in our sample may have older siblings
whohave left the household. Therefore, a childmay be the oldestwithin
a household, but is not necessarily their parents’ ﬁrst biological child.
While this is a limitation of the measure, social birth order provides a
measure of the availability of substitute labor within the household, a
key factor affecting the opportunity costs of children’s school atten-
dance. Following this deﬁnition, birth order ranged from 1 to 9, and
was categorized into three groups for analysis, consisting of ﬁrst or
second-born children (n = 1,049), third or fourth-born children (n =
529) and ﬁfth or later-born children (n = 141).
2.5. Data analysis
We usedmultilevel logistic and linear regression to evaluate the ev-
idence behind each of our predictions. All models were ﬁt using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation in Stata version 13.1. The commands
‘xtmelogit’ and ‘mixed’ were used to account for the clustering of
Table 1
Household characteristics by livelihood (stated primary occupation of household head).
Livelihood Pastoralists Farmers Business Total
N 380 751 84 1215
Ethnic group (%)
Maasai 92.1 23.3 25.0 44.9
Arusha 5.0 23.4 20.2 17.4
Meru 1.8 34.1 33.3 24.0
Other 1.1 19.2 21.4 13.7
Household head education (%)
None / nursery 71.8 33.8 24.3 45.1
Primary 25.7 59.7 52.7 48.6
Secondary or above 2.4 6.5 23.0 6.3
Wealth index (mean score) 1.6 3.9 5.7 3.3
Food insecurity score (mean score) 16.0 10.2 8.2 11.9
Acres cultivated (mean acres) 1.7 2.6 2.5 2.3
Livestock owned (mean TLU) 6.4 2.4 2.8 3.7
Household size (mean number
of people)
5.4 5.3 5.0 5.3
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dom intercepts. Failure to adjust estimates for the effect of non-
independent sampling increases the risk of Type I error, and can obscure
trends within communities masked when data are analyzed at aggre-
gate levels (e.g. Lawson et al., 2015). An intermediate random effect
for household is not included because there were only 1.7, 1.5 and 2.3
children per household for Ever educated, Progressed and Edyears respec-
tively, and when clusters (i.e. households) are unbalanced and sparsely
populated, there is the risk that both ﬁxed and random effects may be
overestimated (Clarke, 2008). All models included child age in years.
Separate models were run for each outcome: (i) for the sample of
7–13 year olds, with Ever educated as the outcome, (ii) for the sample
of 14–19 year olds with Progressed as the outcome, and (iii) for all
school-aged individuals with Edyears as the outcome. A ﬁrst set of
models was runwithout interactions to assess themain effects of liveli-
hood, wealth, gender, and birth order. A second set of models added in
interactions between livelihood and wealth, livelihood and gender,
wealth and gender, and wealth and birth order, keeping interactions
found to be signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal models.3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows various household characteristics by livelihood cate-
gory. Just over half of the sample classify themselves as farmers, with
only a small proportion of households being engaged primarily in busi-
ness or a professional job. However, the data on land use and livestock
ownership indicate that households maintain a certain degree of diver-
sity in livelihood, with 66% of households both cultivating land and
owning livestock. A large overlap between livelihood and ethnic group
can be seen, with 92% of pastoralists being Maasai. Pastoralists experi-
enced a greater degree of food insecurity, andwere poorer than farmers
and business owners on average, and household heads had a lower level
of education (see also Lawson et al., 2014).
At age 13, 90% of children (n = 129) had at least some educa-
tion, indicating that the majority of children do at least enroll in
primary school. Fewer children progress to secondary school,
with 48% of those aged 19 (n = 86) having progressed. At age 13,
individuals have on average 5.0 (SD = 2.1) years of education, in-
creasing to an average of 7.5 (SD = 3.5) years of education at age
19. It therefore appears that most children attend and progress
through primary school, but a much lower proportion progress to
secondary school, and very few get more than one or two years
of secondary education.3.2. How do education outcomes vary by livelihood?
Our ﬁrst predictionwas that educational investmentwould be lower
for children in pastoralist households, intermediate for those in farming
households, and highest for those in business/professional households.
The results in Table 2 demonstrate that children in pastoralist house-
holds are disadvantaged compared to farming and business households
in all three education outcomes. Even after adjustment for differences in
household wealth, children in farming households have 1.9 (95% conﬁ-
dence interval (CI): 1.2–3.1, p = 0.011) times the odds of having ever
been in school, and 2.4 (95% CI: 1.2–5.0, p = 0.013) times the odds of
progressing to secondary school, compared with children in pastoralist
households. Those in business households have 3.7 (95% CI: 1.4–9.6,
p = 0.009) times the odds of having ever been in school, and 5.8 (95%
CI: 2.0–16.7, p = 0.001) times the odds of progressing to secondary
school. That these effects remain after adjusting for household wealth
indicates that lower educational investment by pastoralist households
is not solely due to their relative poverty. Fig. 1 shows the mean years
of education by age for each livelihood group, demonstrating that pasto-
ralist children have fewer years of education at all ages compared with
children in farming or business households. The effect of livelihood on
years of education increases with age, with less differentiation between
livelihoods at younger ages.3.3. Socioeconomic gradients in education outcomes across livelihoods
Our second prediction was that educational investment would
increase with household wealth, but to a lesser extent among pasto-
ralists than among farmers or business-owners. Wealth did have a
signiﬁcant effect on all educational outcomes, with each unit in-
crease in wealth giving 1.3 (95% CI: 1.2–1.4, p b 0.001) times the
odds of ever having been in school and 1.2 (95% CI: 1.1–1.3,
p b 0.001) times the odds of progressing to secondary school, and
on average 0.2 (95% CI: 0.1–0.2, p b 0.001) more years of education
(Table 2). An interaction between wealth and livelihood (see
Table S2 in supplementary material, available on the journal's
website at www.ehbonline.org), was not found to be signiﬁcant, in-
dicating that the effect of wealth on education outcomes is similar in
all three livelihood groups. However, when wealth is measured in
terms of livestock (TLU) for pastoralists, there is no signiﬁcant effect
of wealth on education outcomes (Table 3).3.4. Education outcomes by gender and birth order
Our third prediction was that educational investment would be
lower in daughters and later-born children. Gender was not found
to be a predictor of having ever been in school for those aged 7 to
13, but daughters aged 14 to 19 had 3.5 (95% CI: 2.3–5.4,
p b 0.001) times the odds of progressing to secondary school com-
pared to sons (Table 2). Daughters also had an advantage over
sons in total years of education, having on average 0.4 years more
for their age (95% CI: 0.2–0.6, p b 0.001). Thus the female advantage
appears to be driven by daughters being more likely to progress to
secondary school than sons. An interaction between gender and
livelihood was not signiﬁcant (see Table S2 in supplementary mate-
rial, available on the journal's website at www.ehbonline.org),
though the direction of effect suggests that daughters aged 7 to 13
may be less advantaged among pastoralists than among farmers or
business-owning households.
While the main effect of social birth order was not signiﬁcant at the
p b 0.05 level for any outcome (see Table 2), there is a marginal trend
(p b 0.1) towards children with more older siblings in their
household having fewer years of education for their age compared to
earlier-born children.
Table 2
Multilevel logistic and linear regressionmodels for effect of livelihood,wealth, gender and social birth order on education outcomes. For eachoutcome, the left-handmodel shows the basic
effects of each predictor, while the right-hand model includes interactions between wealth and gender, and wealth and social birth order.
Ever educated (age 7 to 13) Progressed to secondary school
(age 14 to 19)
Years of education (age 7 to 19)
Odds ratios β coefﬁcients
Observations 1112 607 1719
Mean-centered age (years)a 1.49⁎⁎ 1.50⁎⁎ 1.43⁎⁎ 1.44⁎⁎ 0.55⁎⁎ 0.55⁎⁎
[1.35, 1.63] [1.37, 1.65] [1.27, 1.62] [1.27, 1.63] [0.52, 0.58] [0.52, 0.58]
Livelihood (reference = pastoralists)
Farmers 1.88⁎ 1.83⁎ 2.44⁎ 2.41⁎ 0.65⁎⁎ 0.66⁎⁎
[1.16, 3.05] [1.12, 2.97] [1.19, 4.99] [1.18, 4.94] [0.35, 0.96] [0.36, 0.97]
Business 3.65⁎⁎ 3.59⁎ 5.83⁎⁎ 5.49⁎⁎ 0.99⁎⁎ 1.02⁎⁎
[1.39, 9.60] [1.36, 9.50] [2.04, 16.69] [1.91, 15.82] [0.54, 1.45] [0.57, 1.47]
Household wealth index 1.30⁎⁎ 1.59⁎⁎ 1.20⁎⁎ 1.27⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎ 0.16⁎⁎
[1.17, 1.45] [1.30, 1.94] [1.11, 1.31] [1.10, 1.45] [0.12, 0.20] [0.09, 0.22]
Gender (reference = male)
Female 1.00 0.75 3.50⁎⁎ 4.40⁎⁎ 0.40⁎⁎ 0.14
[0.71, 1.40] [0.44, 1.29] [2.28, 5.36] [2.06, 9.38] [0.21, 0.59] [−0.17, 0.44]
Social birth order (reference = 1–2)
3–4 0.86 1.97⁎ 1.19 1.52 0.00 0.31+
[0.60, 1.24] [1.08, 3.60] [0.72, 1.96] [0.64, 3.59] [−0.21, 0.21] [−0.03, 0.64]
5+ 0.95 2.76⁎ 1.43 0.98 −0.35+ −0.27
[0.55, 1.63] [1.17, 6.53] [0.46, 4.45] [0.09, 11.28] [−0.71, 0.01] [−0.85, 0.30]
Wealth # gender interaction
Wealth # female 1.14 0.94 0.07⁎
[0.95, 1.36] [0.81, 1.10] [0.00, 0.14]
Wealth # social birth order interaction
Wealth # 3–4 0.69⁎⁎ 0.94 –0.08⁎
[0.56, 0.86] [0.80, 1.11] [−0.16,−0.01]
Wealth # 5+ 0.62⁎⁎ 1.07 −0.02
[0.47, 0.83] [0.71, 1.62] [−0.15, 0.10]
Constant 1.77+ 1.19 0.04⁎⁎ 0.04⁎⁎ 2.84⁎⁎ 2.85⁎⁎
[0.95, 3.31] [0.58, 2.41] [0.02, 0.10] [0.01, 0.09] [2.44, 3.23] [2.43, 3.27]
Between village variance 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.37⁎⁎ 0.37⁎⁎
[0.54, 1.28] [0.53, 1.28] [0.47, 1.27] [0.47, 1.26] [0.18, 0.77] [0.18, 0.77]
Within village variance 3.90⁎⁎ 3.88⁎⁎
[3.65, 4.17] [3.62, 4.15]
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
a Age was centered at the mean age for each outcome.
+ p b 0.1.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 3
Multilevel logistic and linear regression models for effect of Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU)
ownership on educational outcomes.
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There is mixed evidence for our ﬁnal prediction that biases by gen-
der and birth order would be more pronounced in wealthier house-
holds. Supporting our predictions, there are statistically signiﬁcant
interactions betweenwealth and gender and betweenwealth and social
birth order in models predicting the total number of years educated for
children between 7 and 19 years (Table 2). These interactions areFig. 1. Years of education by livelihood. Children in pastoralist households have fewer
years of education than children in farming and business owning households, and this dif-
ference increases with age.graphically represented as predicted years of education in Fig. 2. With
regard to gender, we estimate that the relative advantage for daughters
is larger in the wealthiest households (Fig. 2 panel a). For social birthEver educated
(age 7 to 13)
Progression
to secondary
school
(age 14 to 19)
Years of
education
(age 7 to 19)
Odds ratios β coefﬁcients
Observations 340 147 487
Mean-centered age (years)a 1.39⁎⁎ 1.85⁎⁎ 0.43⁎⁎
[1.22, 1.57] [1.33, 2.57] [0.37, 0.49]
Log TLU large 0.91 1.1 0.18
[0.69, 1.20] [0.65, 1.86] [−0.07, 0.42]
Constant 2.41⁎ 0.12⁎⁎ 2.90⁎⁎
[1.17, 4.99] [0.05, 0.31] [2.23, 3.58]
Between village variation 0.73 0.00b 2.93⁎⁎
[0.36, 1.50] [0.00, .] [2.26, 3.61]
Within village variation 0.85⁎⁎
[0.78, 0.91]
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
a Age was centered at the mean age for each outcome.
b Between village variation was not signiﬁcant but multilevel results are presented for
consistency.
⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Fig. 2. Predicted years of education at age 12, by (a) household wealth and gender and (b) household wealth and birth order, and predicted probability of having ever been ed-
ucatedat age 10by (c) householdwealth and gender and (d) householdwealth andbirth order.Daughters receivemoreyears of education than sons inwealthyhouseholds, but not in
the poorest households. Greater household wealth increased the probability of ever going to school for all children with no signiﬁcant interaction with gender. In terms of both years of
education and the probability of ever attending school, signiﬁcant interactions between birth order and householdwealth indicate that a modest advantage to earlier-born children is ap-
parent in wealthy households. See Table 2 for effect estimates. Values for household wealth: ‘Poorest’ = 5% centile, and ‘Wealthiest’ = 95% centile.
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to be advantaged among wealthier households (Fig. 2 panel b). Fig. 2
also plots estimated interactions between wealth and gender and
wealth and birth order for the predicted probabilities of ever attending
school for children between 7 and 13 years (converting from the odds
ratios in Table 2). The estimated interaction betweenwealth and gender
for this outcome is non-signiﬁcant (Table 2). However, there is a signif-
icant interaction betweenwealth and social birth order, suggesting that
increasing household wealth is most likely to be channeled into earlier-
born children within the household. Interactions between wealth and
gender or wealth and birth order were non-signiﬁcant for the odds of
secondary school progression.
4. Discussion
4.1. Rural livelihoods and educational investment
The international development sector strongly emphasizes the ben-
eﬁts of education, including improved prospects on the adult labormar-
ket, access to information and the empowerment to better pursue
individual goals that ultimately advance human capital at both individ-
ual and aggregate levels. Yet, whether or not to send children to school
presents a dilemma for parents living in developing rural communities,
even when resources are available. On the one hand, education holds
the promise of white-collar jobs and improved economic and social sta-
tus. However, for many, the poor quality of available schooling and the
lack of viable labor markets make educational investment a risky gam-
ble. Thiswill be particularly the casewhen formal schooling restricts op-
portunities for children to contribute back to the household economy
they in turn rely upon for future investment. Moreover, children’s
work at home can present its own, potentially more valuable,opportunities to learn skills speciﬁc to local subsistence, which for
some families may be more useful and relevant to their future
wellbeing. These cautionary points follow clearly from evolutionary an-
thropological scholarship on human life history which has, for example,
emphasized that high fertility rates are sustainable partly because older
children are recruited as ‘helpers at the nest’ (Kramer, 2011), and the
importance of childhood as a period for acquiring the skills necessary
for competent adult functioning (Kaplan, 1996; Kaplan & Bock, 2001).
As such, wemust interpret educational investment as a formof parental
investment that can be explained through consideration of its beneﬁts
and costs to parents and children, which will vary according to socio-
economic context, and by child characteristics such as gender.
Supporting our predictions, children in households identifying as
pastoralists (predominantly Maasai households in this context) had
the lowest levels of education across all three outcomes. Our ﬁndings
are consistent with qualitative studies that have documented the bar-
riers to education faced by Maasai pastoralists (Bishop, 2007; Coast,
2002; Holland, 1996). That this educational ‘disadvantage’ remains
after the inclusion of random effects for village and statistical adjust-
ments for wealth between households, suggests that such differences
cannot simply be accounted for by differences in poverty, or by differen-
tial access to schools, which we presume is similar for pastoralists,
farmers and business owners living in the same villages (although we
acknowledge pastoralist households may often reside further from vil-
lage centers). Instead it seems likely that, over and above these factors,
pastoralists perceive lower beneﬁts and higher opportunity costs to for-
mally educating children. Thus we emphasize the role of demand, rath-
er than simply supply, in explaining patterns of educational attainment.
Low perceived beneﬁts may stem from the fact that, as a marginalized
population subgroup, the Maasai are often most distant from viable
labor markets dependent on formal education. High perceived
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trade-off’ (Siele, Swift, & Kratli, 2013: 206) parents face between send-
ing children to school, or engaging children in specialist work and learn-
ing at home to support vulnerable homesteads. Such trade-offs are not
unique to pastoralists, but responsibilities of herding and caring for live-
stock typically begin at a very young age (6–7 years) and herding activ-
ities are generally difﬁcult to combine with education because they
occupy children for most of the day and may involve taking livestock
far outside of villages (Sperling & Galaty, 1990). Children supporting
farming or business-owning households may be better able to combine
work and school because work does not necessarily involve leaving the
village. Interestingly we observe greater differentiation by livelihood at
the progression to secondary education compared to early education.
Thismay reﬂect growing responsibilities with age, as well as the greater
distances to secondary schools, and relaxed external pressure to enroll
children, as only primary education is ofﬁcially mandatory in Tanzania.
We also found evidence for our prediction that wealthier house-
holds would invest more in educational attainment. Increasing house-
hold wealth is expected to improve educational outcomes as
wealthier parents are better able to bear the costs of schooling, and
may also perceive greater beneﬁts to education following higher cer-
tainty in the returns to investment (i.e. lower extrinsic risk) and the
ability to capitalize on education and employment opportunities. This
pattern was seen during the European demographic transition, when
wealthier parents were the ﬁrst to adopt a more quality-focused strate-
gy, investing in education and reducing their fertility (Coale &
Treadway, 1986; Lesthaeghe & Wilson, 1986). The effect of wealth in
our study increased with age, which may reﬂect the increasing direct
costs of education, as primary education is free but fees must be paid
for secondary school. It may also reﬂect the higher opportunity costs
of education at older ages, as teenagers in poorer householdsmay be re-
quired to contribute labor or income to the household.
Household wealth measured through the asset index appeared to
have similar effects on educational outcomes among all livelihoods,
contrary to theprediction that outcomeswould be similar for pastoralist
children regardless of householdwealth. However, little effect of house-
hold livestock ownership on educational outcomes among pastoralists
was found. This supports Bishop’s (2007) ﬁnding of little differentiation
by livestock wealth in education, which she attributed to the greater
labor requirements in households with larger herds increasing the op-
portunity costs of schooling. The differing effects of the two types of
wealth (material assets and livestock) may reﬂect the diversiﬁcation
of pastoralist livelihoods in this area; in recent years material wealth
and education have become more important status symbols, and edu-
cated individuals often prefer to only keep a small herd (Bishop, 2007;
Heffernan et al., 2001). Thus we may be observing a pattern of more
‘modern’ households accruing material wealth and investing in educa-
tion for their children, and more ‘traditional’ households accruing live-
stock wealth and investing less in education.
4.2. Biased parental investment and economic development
We expected that educational investmentwould be lower in daugh-
ters than sons, assuming men are more able to capitalize on education
than women, and because in the patrilocal groups comprising our sam-
ple, parentsmay havemore opportunity to recoup beneﬁts from invest-
ment in sons rather than daughters, who marry out into other families.
Levels of adult education reveal a history of female disadvantage in ed-
ucation in our sample, with 67% of men aged 20 and over having re-
ceived some education compared to 58% of women. Previous studies
have also emphasized the ‘double disadvantage’ faced speciﬁcally by
pastoralist girls and women. Historically, Maasai pastoralist women
have had low status in comparison to men (Llewellyn-Davies, 1981),
and recent qualitative studies have reported that among some
Tanzanian Maasai communities girls face barriers such as open resis-
tance to girls’ education among community leaders, and the belief thatgirls’ education is a ‘waste of money’, as girls are expected to move to
their husband’s family home (Holland, 1996; Kiragu & Warrington,
2012; Raymond, 2014; Temba, Warioba, & Msabila, 2013). However,
in this sample girls receive greater educational investment overall,
with higher odds of progression to secondary education and greater
total years of education obtained than boys. There is some evidence
that this biased investment into female education is driven by differ-
ences among the wealthiest families. This suggests that investment in
girls’ education has not only caught up with investment in boys’ educa-
tion in recent years, but in contemporary cohorts, and particularly for
wealthy families, our data suggest a marginal bias to preferentially edu-
cating girls.
Global trends of rising investment in girls’ education are generally
understood to reﬂect a number of shifts accompanying economic devel-
opment, including relatively delayed and/or reduced early fertility that
competes with education, and increased opportunities for female
labor market participation. In most developed countries, gender parity
in education was reached several decades ago, with themost recent co-
horts now showing that more women than men attend and complete
tertiary education, leading policy debates in some instances to shift
focus on to increasingmale attainment (Pekkarinen, 2012). The reasons
for this female bias are still being unraveled, but appear to be partly a
function of a higher susceptibility of men to behavioral and mental dif-
ﬁculties which do not favor educational progression (Becker, Hubbard,
& Murphy, 2010; Pekkarinen, 2012). It seems unlikely that such shifts
alone could account for the higher levels of female education observed
in this study, andwe emphasize that at a national level, recent estimates
point to a signiﬁcant female disadvantage in secondary school atten-
dance and examination performance in Tanzania (DHS, 2010: 18;
UNESCO, 2011: 206). However, previous studies have revealed that
female-biased investment in small-scale societies can be favored by a
number of related factors under speciﬁc conditions. For example, it
has been hypothesized that opportunities for hypergyny, whereby
girls marry into wealthier neighboring populations, drive preferential
investment in girls in Kenyan Mukogodo pastoralists and Hungarian
gypsies (Bereczkei & Dunbar, 1997; Cronk, 1989). The gender division
of work responsibilities may also increase the opportunity costs of
school attendance for boys relative to girls. Girls do more household
work, which may be more easily combined with school by being done
outside of school hours, whereas boys’ responsibilities include cattle
herding and farm work, which may take them away from the village
during the day. Whether or not such explanations could apply in this
context is impossible to answer without supporting data on the costs
and long-term consequences of education.
We also note that increasing female education in Tanzania has taken
place within a wider context of development campaigns, which often
focus speciﬁcally on educating girls in order to achieve gender equity
in education (e.g. United Nations Millennium Development Goals and
Education for All goals both aimed to eliminate gender disparity in edu-
cation). Many development organizations operate in the Arusha region,
and it is thus possible that parental perceptions of the costs and beneﬁts
of educationmay be inﬂuenced by external interventions. This possibil-
ity highlights the fact that for many vulnerable rural communities the
returns to education are shifting and uncertain, and parents may lack
accurate information about pay-offs to investment.
We also found some evidence of predicted birth order effects in our
study among the wealthiest families, with later-borns being disadvan-
taged compared to earlier-born children. A later-born disadvantage in
education has been documented in previous small-scale and large-
scale studies (Al-Samarrai & Peasgood, 1998; Gibson & Sear, 2010),
and is anticipated given the sequential nature of household resource di-
lution with increasing family size and anticipated parental preferences
to early born offspring (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Hertwig et al., 2002). For
both gender and birth order there is some evidence that parental invest-
ment biases are more pronounced among wealthier households, with
less evidence of differentiation by birth order and gender in poorer
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(2010) who observed greater biases in the education of children by
birth order and gender among wealthier households in both rural
Ethiopian and Malawian communities. They interpreted this pattern in
terms of a shift to a ‘quality-focused’ reproductive strategy in response
to increased perceived returns to education and a decreased need for
child labor (Kaplan, 1996). This account is not necessarily at odds with
the macro-level observation that economic development generally
leads to more equal treatment of children, and the common narrative
in the policy literature that biased treatment of children arises from
poverty (e.g. a recent United Nations report on education states that
“poverty exacerbates the gender divide”, (UNESCO, 2010: 6)). Instead
it suggests a potential intermediate stage whereby in high-fertility pop-
ulations in the early stages of demographic transition, parents enjoying
greater wealth may opt to preferentially educate children with the
highest perceived returns on that investment. In later stages, as fertility
levels decline, parents becomemore able to bear the costs of high-level
investment in all offspring. Such trends may be largely overlooked be-
cause most of what we know about the trends in education associated
with economic development comes from large-scale surveys such as
the DHS, which are ineffective at examining trends with communities.
4.3. Limitations
While our study has a number of advantages, including a relatively
large sample and unusual quantitative exploration of multiple educa-
tional outcomes for pastoralists and their farmingneighbors,we caution
that our measures rely on self-reports of school enrolment. Further-
more, even if a child is enrolled, this does not mean they necessarily at-
tend regularly. Penalties apply to parents who do not enroll their
children in primary school, but are more difﬁcult to enforce for children
who are enrolled but do not attend. Parents may thus enroll their child
in school with little intention of them actually attending, so that our
measures of investment effectively over-estimated parental commit-
ments to education (Al-Samarrai & Peasgood, 1998). Self-report data
could also hypothetically lead to reporting bias by gender. For example,
due to the recent campaigns to achieve gender parity in education, par-
ents may be more reluctant to report that girls are not in school, and
that girls are actually not attending school asmuch as boys. It is also im-
portant to note that our results are based on children resident within
the sampled households, and this could introduce bias since it is not un-
common for children to be sent away to relatively urban centers to at-
tend secondary school. However, such bias seems unlikely to account
for the observed differences between sons' and daughters' education
because our sample includes roughly equal numbers of each sex. Finally,
we acknowledge that this study deals speciﬁcally with one facet of pa-
rental investment, educational investment, and that other forms of in-
vestment such as time and money may show different results.
4.4. Conclusion
Despite widespread interest in education and its role in the demo-
graphic transition, relatively few studies have quantitatively explored
its determinants in relation to variation in rural livelihoods, or directly
considered how differences in wealth within rural communities inﬂu-
ence patterns of educational investment. Our study addresses these is-
sues and also broader concerns regarding an overreliance of education
studies on highly aggregated national datasets, whichmay conceal pat-
terns in minority groups such as pastoralists (Dyer, 2010; IWGIA, 2006;
UNESCO, 2010). We ﬁnd that pastoralists are considerably less likely to
send children to school than neighboring farmers and business owners,
and that the most salient form of wealth (livestock) among pastoralists
has little impact on education. We also ﬁnd some evidence that overall
wealthier families are more likely to invest in education preferentially
by gender andbirth orderwithin communities. These ﬁndings are large-
ly consistent with expectations derived from both evolutionary andeconomic models of the family. However, we conclude by cautioning
that the theoretical grounding of such expectations, in terms of the an-
ticipated costs and beneﬁts of education, remains poorly substantiated
empirically by both the present study and thewider literature. In partic-
ular, there is a scarcity of studies directly contrasting the extent towhich
children’s education is traded-off against labor contributions for alter-
native livelihoods, at different levels of wealth and urbanization, and
few studies have explicitly examined both the real and the perceived
short and long-term beneﬁts of sending children to school for rural
communities undergoing economic development. Within the evolu-
tionary anthropological literature such evidence gaps reﬂect a tradition-
al disciplinary focus on questions most relevant to our evolutionary
past, rather than our ever-changing present (Gibson & Lawson, 2015).
Focusing future research on these priority areas will not only contribute
to our understanding of parental investment strategies and their role in
driving demographic change, but also has the potential to yield a richer
understanding of decision-making surrounding education and youth
employment in rapidly developing rural areas that could help to inform
current policy debates.
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